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The central institutions of youth justice: government bureaucracy and the 
importance of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. 
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Abstract  
The government’s recent ‘bonfire of the quangos’ put at issue the future of the YJB. Drawing 
on research with YJB staff, ministers and civil servants, this paper argues a central body like 
the YJB is crucial for youth justice. The institutions of government bureaucracy are an 
important part of the ‘penal field’ (Page 2013) in which policy is produced. An ‘arm’s length’ 
body outside the civil service allows central decision making to be directed by expertise and 
child-centred principles.  However, the same features that make the YJB important also make 
it both high risk for ministers and difficult to defend. 
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Introduction  
In 2010 the Coalition Government came into power promising to ‘restore democracy and 
accountability to public life’ (Hansard 14 Oct 2010 : Column 505). The landscape of central 
government, it announced, had become cluttered by quangos. The delegation of state activity 
to these ‘arm’s length’ bodies wasted public funds, allowed ministers to duck responsibility 
for their policy areas and gave unelected officials ‘licence to meddle in people's lives’ (ibid). 
Declaring a ‘complete culture change in government’ (ibid, Column 506), under the Public 
Bodies Act (2011) the government made provision to abolish or reform over 500 Non-
departmental public bodies (NDPBs – the principal form of quango in the UK).   
 
While ostentatious, the government’s reforms were ostensibly neither contentious – the 
Coalition was merely the latest in a successive series of governments to declare a ‘bonfire of 
the quangos’ (e.g. Gash and Rutter 2011) – nor connected to any one policy area. Yet the 
inclusion of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (YJB) in its cull pulled the 
central organisation of youth justice systems into the heart of political debate, bringing to 
focus the importance of the nature of government institutions at their core.  
 
Created as the cornerstone of the first New Labour administration’s sweeping youth justice 
reforms under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the YJB is an executive NDPB with 
responsibility for oversight of the English and Welsh youth justice system. It has a broad and 
powerful range of statutory duties: it monitors the youth justice system, advises the Secretary 
of State on its standards and operation, identifies effective practice across youth justice 
services, commissions research, and makes grants to local authority Youth Offending Teams 
(YOTs) for services it deems effective,  commissions places in the juvenile secure estate and 
places young people in custody.   
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As an NDPB the YJB is located outside conventional government structures. While it is 
ultimately accountable to the Secretary of State for Justice and ‘sponsored’ by the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ) who fund and audit it, it is not part of any government department and its staff 
are not civil servants. It has permanence beyond any government department with legislation 
required to establish and abolish it, and is are accountable for its daily operation not to a 
minister but to a Board and a Chief Executive. It therefore operates ‘on the fringes’ of central 
government (Pliatzky 1992, p556), outside direct ministerial control. It is the largest NDPB 
sponsored through the MoJ, currently with a staff of over 200 executive officials who are 
directed by a Board of 12 members, and a budget of £255m (YJB 2014).   
 
The government argued that the size and political importance of the YJB’s functions required 
them to be brought directly under  ministerial control. The YJB would be abolished and its 
functions transferred to a new Youth Justice Division within the MoJ. Like the YJB, this new 
Division would have a Board of expert advisers, and would be led in the first instance by the 
then YJB Chief Executive John Drew (Hansard 23 Jun 2011 : Column 28WS). In this way, 
the changes signified by the abolition of the YJB were ostensibly simply a restructuring of 
government bureaucracy: the central administration of youth justice would no longer be the 
responsibility of an NDPB but a departmental unit. However, to the surprise of the 
government, this news was greeted with dismay across the public sector and a vociferous 
rebellion in the House of Lords, putting at risk the Government’s entire legislative agenda 
and resulting in a dramatic reprieve for the YJB on the final reading of the Bill.  
 
The fate of the YJB was met with little academic response, with some commentators 
expressing uncertainty about its significance (e.g. Morgan 2010, Puffett 2011, though see 
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Souhami et al 2012). Indeed, despite a powerful tradition of critical analysis of penal policy 
in criminological research more generally, little attention has been paid to the institutions of 
central bureaucracy through which it is administered (for exceptions see Rock 1995, 2004; on 
other areas of the civil service see Page 2003, Page and Jenkins 2005, Stevens 2011). 
However, drawing on research with senior YJB members, ministers and civil servants, this 
paper argues that the central organisation of youth justice systems is of crucial importance 
both for penal outcomes and for academic scholarship. First, it argues that government 
bureaucracy is a central part of the ‘penal field’ (Page 2013) in which policy is produced. 
Second, for this reason it is important that the central administration of youth justice is 
located outside the civil service, at arm’s length to ministers.   
. 
This paper therefore argues for the continued existence of the YJB - or a body like it. 
However, two clarifications are necessary. First, the argument presented here is structural: it 
is concerned with the institutions of central bureaucracy. It is not an evaluation of the current 
operation of either the YJB or the civil service, nor the individuals within it. Second, it is 
important not to overstate the transformative potential of the YJB. The YJB is not a 
reforming or campaigning organisation but a body of government administration. It operates 
within the constraints of a system that has been described as  ‘a conduit of social harm’ 
(Goldson 2010, see also e.g. Goldson 2013, Muncie 2011) whose architecture still betrays 
some evidence of the climate of populist punitivism in which it was created (most notably it 
has the lowest age of criminal responsibility in the European Union other than Scotland1) and 
the effects of a prolific and expansive legislative activity2.  However, the central argument of 
                                                 
1 The age of criminal responsibility in Scotland is eight: children can be referred to a Children’s Hearing on 
offence grounds from this age. However, since the Criminal Responsibility and Licencing Act (2010) they 
cannot be prosecuted by a criminal court under the age of 12.  
2 However, as I discuss below, there is evidence of an important departure from the criminalising and 
incarcerating strategies of early New Labour youth justice, with a recent marked decline in the numbers of first 
time entrants to the youth justice system and a dramatic fall in prison population..  
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this paper is that the institutions of government bureaucracy are not all the same. Through its 
removal from the civil service, the YJB allows for the expert administration of youth justice 
and introduces a competing logic which provides the opportunity for decision making to be 
structured by the best interests of the child rather than ministerial outcomes. Its effects are 
therefore subtle but important: it provides a buffer against both populist ministerial impulses 
and the deficiencies of Whitehall3.  
 
The research 
The research reported here builds on a major research study of the operation of the YJB. The 
first phase of research involved ethnographic fieldwork of the YJB in one calendar year, 
2006-7. Research included observations of almost all YJB internal activities and meetings, 
over fifty depth interviews with Board members and officials  in all roles throughout the 
organisation, documentary analysis, and interviews and focus groups with YOT staff.  The 
bulk of the data presented in this paper reports on a second, more recent phase of research 
which has followed the proposed abolition and reprieve of the YJB through interviews with 
senior YJB officials and Board members, including three former Chairs; senior officials 
(Director level and above) in the MoJ who oversaw the public body reforms; and the early 
architects of the legislation including former Home Secretary and Secretary of State for 
Justice Jack Straw and Lord Norman Warner, who as adviser to Jack Straw created the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 that established the YJB and was its first Chair. Most of the 
interviews reported here have been conducted over the last twelve months.  
                                                 
3 Again, this paper is concerned with the possibilities  enabled by the YJB’s structural location. It does not 
suggest that these possibilities were wholly understood or intended by the architects of the YJB (though neither 
does it suggest they were wholly inadvertent). Indeed, as described below, the YJB was established to usher in a 
programme of youth justice quite unlike the child-centered, diversionary approach it now champions. Moreover, 
it was initially staffed by a team of senior officials very closely allied to the New Labour administration and its 
objectives were largely indistinguishable (see Souhami 2014 for further discussion). However, this brings into 
focus the importance of its structural location: as this paper argues, it is the YJB’s  positioning outside 
departmental structures that has enabled decision making at the center to become structured by the best interests 
of the child rather than ministerial agendas.   
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While every effort has been made to maintain anonymity of the research participants, this is 
inevitably challenging in the context of elite political actors. Where necessary to the 
argument I have provided some contextual detail of the respondent’s role: for example, ‘a 
former Chair’ or ‘senior official’. MoJ officials were asked to nominate the titles by which 
they would be described. However some research participants (such as Jack Straw and Lord 
Warner) are inevitably identifiable: interviews were therefore conducted on this basis. 
Further, it has not always been possible to maintain the anonymity of Rod Morgan, a former 
YJB Chair, due to the public nature of events reported here. In these cases I have been careful 
to use data only to illuminate positions already in the public domain.  
 
As I have shown elsewhere (Souhami 2014), the way the YJB operates and is understood by 
its members has transformed over the course of its life. The interpretation of its role and 
relationships at any moment are intrinsically connected to both the broader political and 
social context in which it is located and the personalities of key actors (see also Rock 2004). 
In an arena as volatile as youth justice, institutions, actors and the environment in which they 
operate change particularly rapidly.  The long-term focus of the study is intended to allow 
both change and continuity to emerge: it both captures the flux and transformation that 
continues to surround the YJB, and allows for the identification of enduring themes which at 
some times may become clear and at others obscured. It is such underpinning issues which 
are the focus of this paper.   
The importance of government bureaucracy 
The neglect of government bureaucracy in criminological research reflects an enduring 
assumption in both academic and policy debates that it is unconnected to the formulation of 
policy. ‘Policy’ is seen as solely the domain of ministers and a relatively narrow group of 
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elite civil servants who advise them, with the role of the supporting bureaucracy – whether 
the civil service or NDPBs such as the YJB – simply to implement it (Page and Jenkins 
2005). Indeed, this is mirrored in a ‘normative institutional understanding’ (Gains 1999, 
p716) of a clear split between responsibility for policy formulation and administration among 
both ministers and civil servants themselves. The assumption of such a divide is unsurprising. 
The purpose of government bureaucracy is, after all, to support ministers (e.g. Campbell and 
Wilson 1995): it does not have the political or constitutional authority to define its own 
objectives. However, as I have argued (Souhami 2014), in reality the division is less clear: 
government officials are intrinsically involved in policy making.  
 
First, officials have to elaborate ministerial directions to put them into action. As Page and 
Jenkins put it, ‘if politicians knew how they wanted the problems solved sufficiently to give 
their administrative subordinates direct instructions, they would not need policy 
bureaucracies’(2005, vi). As  research in the civil service has shown, as a result officials are 
routinely involved in formulating policy: discretion in relation to even small questions of 
implementation can define and change the shape of a policy (Page 2003, Page and Jenkins 
2005). In an NDPB where entire functions are delegated, the scope for discretion is 
considerable. This is particularly the case in the YJB where the parameters of their statutory 
functions are ambiguous: their duty to ‘advise the Secretary of State’ for example is open to 
multiple interpretations (see Souhami 2014 for further discussion).   Second, in politically 
charged areas in particular, even ‘implementation’ decisions formally delegated to NDPBs 
can themselves constitute policy (Gains 2003).  Most obviously, the YJB’s  role in 
commissioning or decommissioning secure estate places directly shapes the size and nature of 
the secure estate and is thus inextricable with broader youth justice strategy.  Third, 
bureaucracy is a site at which policy ideas emerge and are promoted or resisted. As well as 
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providing formal advice,  officials at all levels are engaged in informal processes of influence 
and negotiation. Further, as I discuss below, rather than neutral arbiters of technical 
information,  officials instead create particular constructions of problems and solutions -  
‘good stories’ which can be presented to ministers (Majone 1989, Stevens 2011).  
 
Central government officials are therefore not only routinely involved in decision making, 
but shape how problems are constructed and thus what is considered possible.  For this 
reason, as I will show, the institutional context of government administration is of central 
importance.  
The importance of NDPBs: ‘We could never be civil servants’ 
The architects of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 explained that the establishment of the 
YJB outside departmental structures was fundamental.   A central body was required to 
oversee not just New Labour’s sweeping programme of reform but the interventionist and 
closely managed youth justice system that emerged. Lord Warner explained that his extensive 
career as a civil servant convinced him that the vast, multi- function civil service simply could 
not provide the attention to operational detail required. The Home Office had a particularly 
poor reputation in its capacity for implementation: 
One of the people keenest on the YJB was me. … I had no confidence, absolutely 
zero confidence, that the Home Office could manage anything. The history of the 
Home Office since then has demonstrated how justified I was.   
As a single purpose, dedicated body the YJB could provide an operational oversight of the 
reforms: as Jack Straw put it, they could act as ‘the midwives of change’. More generally, 
they could provide a specific focus for youth justice both in operational management and in 
central policy making, ensuring in particular it was treated differently to the adult system. As 
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Jack Straw explained, if the YJB was abolished ‘the danger is that [the MoJ] wouldn't be 
paying attention to it [youth justice].  And Secretaries of State might not be paying attention 
to it’.  
 
Second, the creation of the YJB outside departmental structures recognised the limitations of 
the civil service in producing youth justice policy. Youth justice was one of the many 
‘wicked issues’ preoccupying the first New Labour government that cut across departmental 
remits. The Audit Commission’s (1996) report Misspent Youth on which the reforms had 
closely drawn had argued that, given the multiple disadvantage experienced by young 
offenders, a multi-agency approach was vital in central government as well as local services. 
Yet, as Lord Warner explained, cross-departmental policy development could not be 
achieved within existing structures:   
The Home Office had a terrible reputation for working across Whitehall. … Cross 
departmental working is difficult across Whitehall anyway, but they’re one of the 
extreme cases.  
Further, youth justice policy needed external input:  as Lord Warner explained, it ‘requires 
you to interact with the world outside.  You have to talk to people who know more’. 
However, this was impossible within an ‘insulated’ civil service (also Kemp 1990). Instead, 
civil servants were ‘Whitehall Westminster captives…. They don’t have lasting, long term, 
relationships of trust with the interests they need to work in’. As a senior YJB official put it,  
‘[for] senior civil servants their career stands and falls on their ability to satisfy ministers,  
and by and large that means working with  ministers in Westminster’.  By contrast, their 
position outside departmental structures allowed YJB members to ‘get out of Westminster 
and go out and meet people, talk to them’: this was ‘how we build up the fund of knowledge 
that we have about what is actually happening out there and bring it back in to Whitehall’.   
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Third, placing the YJB outside departmental structures liberated it from a notoriously 
conservative, compliant and risk-averse civil service culture (e.g. Brooks and Bate 1994, 
Driscoll and Morris 2001, Kemp 1990). This had the immediate benefit of allowing the 
innovation and speed required to implement New Labour’s extensive programme of reform. 
But it also allowed for a more exploratory, critical mode of functioning. For example, Lord 
Warner described his relative freedom as first YJB Chair:    
We could do what a government department can’t do. We were able to let our hair 
down in discussions. We could also say we didn’t know, we didn’t have all the 
answers, ‘let’s have a conversation about how this is going to work’. Civil servants 
can’t say they don’t have the answers.  
This freedom is of course strongly limited: a senior YJB official explained, ‘at the back of all 
officials minds are, if you step too far beyond what you know the minister believes, then 
they’ll stop listening to you altogether. It’s a trade-off’. However, there was a strongly-felt 
contrast with civil servants in the ability of YJB officials to express ideas counter to 
ministerial agendas: as a senior YJB official put it, their independence from the civil service 
made staff feel ‘more at ease to say what they really believe’. 
 
NDPBs and expert knowledge  
Finally, and crucially for this discussion, removing the administration of youth justice from 
the civil service allowed for it to be conducted by people with substantive expertise.  Careers 
in the civil service are structured around ‘generalism’ in which specialisation is deliberately 
avoided and civil servants expected to move to new posts frequently (e.g. Campbell and 
Wilson 1995, Kemp 1990, Stevens 2011). This approach is intended to give officials 
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experience of a wide range of policy areas, in order to develop their expertise in the 
technicalities of the policy process and encourage new ways of thinking (Rock 1995, 
Campbell and Wilson 1995). Further, short-term posts reduce the possibility of officials 
developing an intellectual or ideological attachment to any particular approach to a policy 
problem (Page and Jenkins 2005, p148). In this way, civil service careers are structured to 
provide the technical skills needed to support ministers who themselves are only in post a 
short time.  Yet as a result, expert knowledge of the policy area within departments is rare, 
both among civil servants and the ministers they support.   By contrast, work in an NDPB 
requires a sustained period of office in a single area of executive activity, allowing for 
specialisation and continuity  of knowledge.   Even those YJB officials with backgrounds in 
administration rather than youth justice are therefore able to gain a subject expertise which 
would be impossible within the civil service.  However, because NDPBs are located outside 
the civil service, they are also able to involve experts in their substantive work (also Pliatzky 
1992). The overall strategy of the organisation is set by a Board consisting of those with 
expertise in youth justice and related areas; further, because executive officials are not civil 
servants they can be appointed from relevant professional backgrounds. For example, during 
the ethnographic fieldwork for this study, the majority of the 212 YJB executive staff had 
backgrounds in YOTs, local government or related areas, with 25% of all staff on short term 
secondment from service delivery (a programme intended to maintain the currency of 
practice knowledge in the YJB).  
 
An NPDB therefore uniquely provides the structural opportunity for the expert administration 
of youth justice. As senior YJB officials put it, civil servants were necessarily ‘professional 
amateurs’ (see Fulton 1968): ‘people who know nothing about youth justice, what the basics 
are’. By contrast, Board members and officials described themselves as ‘people who really 
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know about their sector’, who have an ‘empathy and understanding and direct experience of 
what [practitioners] are talking about’4.  In a complex, cross cutting policy area such as youth 
justice which concerns complex needs and multiple disadvantage, expertise and continuity of 
knowledge is particularly vital5.    However, the absorption of non-civil servant specialists 
into government bureaucracy had a further important effect: it introduced a competing logic 
into central administration. 
The civil service is organised according to a logic of bureaucratic rationality: its primary 
objective is to support ministers in an efficient and effective way (e.g. Campbell and Wilson 
1995). While civil servants have considerable discretion, this is closely directed to meet the 
expectations of their ministers rather than any other personal or organisational goals (Page 
and Jenkins 2005, Campbell and Wilson 2005).  Indeed, civil servants are expected to be 
‘politically promiscuous’ (Rose 1987) so that they can work on behalf of any elected 
government.  However, the expertise of YJB staff disrupted this organising logic.  
First, the appointment of staff on the basis of their expertise encouraged staff to base decision 
making on expert knowledge rather than ministerial agendas. As a senior YJB official 
explained, this was particularly the case for Board members who are ‘appointed on their 
individual merits and .. definitely feel rightly that they have a right to articulate something 
that they know is not going in the direction of official policy and they have a right to be heard 
on that’. But in addition, professional expertise is itself ideologically structured. It does not 
just consist of ‘technical’ knowledge but ‘practical’ knowledge which is developed through 
professional experience (e.g. Schön 1983). It is therefore inextricable with the values of 
professional traditions. As youth justice social work gives primacy to the welfare and best 
                                                 
4 In fact, claims to expertise among YJB staff were contested, with some questioning the skills and experience 
of their colleagues. However, for this paper the crucial point is the technical expertise enabled by the structural 
location of the YJB in contrast to the civil service.  
5 Indeed this was a central argument to save the YJB. As one peer put it, ‘The most damaged, difficult and 
needy children in our community… must be managed by people with specific experience and expertise’ 
(Baroness Linklater of Butterstone, Hansard 28 March 2011: Column 963).    
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interests of the child, it is unsurprising that these priorities were explicitly reflected in the 
way YJB staff thought about their work. For example, staff described their own work and that 
of the YJB as motivated by ‘want[ing] to improve the lives of children’, to ‘make a difference 
to kids and local communities’.  
It is undoubtedly the case that work in the YJB was also directed to organisational goals, 
including ensuring its own survival. Similarly, it is also the case that senior civil servants, 
including those interviewed here, were personally concerned with the best interests of young 
people. However, the key issue is that in contrast to the civil service, YJB officials were able 
to structure decision making according to principles which were potentially unconnected to 
ministerial outcomes. As a former YJB Chair put it, this was why ‘we could never be civil 
servants’:  
Civil servants .. get up in the morning, and their reason for living is to make sure the 
minister’s happy with what they do. They’re there to serve the minister. Now, that’s 
fine, but I couldn’t spend a day of my life doing that. Not as my only end.   
In this way, while the YJB was established as a central strand of New Labour’s attempt to 
bring a greater control of the functioning of the youth justice system, its non-departmental 
location in fact allowed for the introduction into the heart of central government decision 
making based on professional expertise and principles in the best interests of the child, even 
where this was contrary to ministerial agendas.  This made the YJB a highly risky 
organisation for central government. 
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The risks of the YJB 
The arm’s length relationship of an NDPB to central government in itself creates significant 
risks for ministers. As Jack Straw explained, ministers are accountable for an area of policy 
over which they have no direct control:  
If you are Secretary of State …you need to be able to have power over what's going 
on, and not be in a position of responsibility without power.  Because when the shit 
hits the fan… the Secretary of State is the person who is there, and it's his or her 
career on the line. 
Further, as Lord Warner explained, it exacerbates a cultural as well as pragmatic anxiety 
about loss of control within Whitehall: ‘Home Office civil servants are all about control. 
Always. Forever. Institutionally. It’s in their bloodstream’.  Despite these risks, the political 
will for the ‘modernisation’ of youth justice in 1998 tipped the balance in favour of the 
creation of the YJB. However, by 2011 the political mood had changed: youth justice was no 
longer a priority, and the abandoning of New Labour projects helped the Coalition herald a 
new era of reforming government. But in addition, the risks posed by the YJB were 
exacerbated by the effects of organisational separation. 
Its status as an NDPB automatically separated the YJB administratively from the civil 
service: staff had different pay and conditions, different administrative routines, and for much 
of the YJB’s life, were housed in a different building6. Yet these important aspects of 
organisational life were reinforced by a more fundamental separation in occupational identity. 
YJB staff positioned themselves against the civil service through their practitioner 
backgrounds and ownership of expert knowledge. For example, a former Chair described 
                                                 
6 The YJB is currently located in the same building as the MoJ, though in a separate area from civil service 
colleagues. This move was ostensibly enforced as a result of austerity measures, though was felt by YJB staff to 
be a move to bring the YJB under closer MoJ control.   
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civil servants as ‘bright young things who know nothing’ in contrast to YJB staff who 
‘actually know what they are talking about’. As Parker (2000) argues, such claims of 
similarity and difference – of ‘us’ and  ‘them’ - are central to the way organisational members 
construct a sense of occupational belonging and identity. Ownership of expert knowledge 
was therefore a means by which the YJB became seen by its members as a distinctive 
organisation.  As a senior YJB official put it, ‘the Home Office aren’t the experts, we are’. 
The distinctiveness from the MoJ was fundamental to the identity and sense of purpose of the 
YJB. Staff were keen to preserve their sense of separation even through their administrative 
processes: for example, the YJB did not communicate with ministers through submissions – 
the written form of advice used by the civil service. As a former Chair put it, ‘I am never 
going to write a submission. Because I am not a civil servant, I am independently appointed 
and I don’t write very often to ministers and when I do it’s going to be a personal letter’.   Yet 
within the MoJ these statements of separation were received very differently. The YJB was 
seen as simultaneously making false claims of independence while demonstrating their 
naiveté. A senior MoJ official explained: ‘A letter is the way that departments communicate 
between each other, so we very rarely do it internally.  …  You're not another department, 
you're arm's length, [there’s] not a bloody international boundary, you're part of the 
departmental family’.   More generally, MoJ officials described an atmosphere of mutual 
suspicion: the YJB was a ‘mistrusting’ organisation, it had a ‘sense of maverickness’, it had 
‘gone UDI’ (a civil service acronym for ‘Unilaterally Declared Independence’).  
However, the mistrust of the YJB was fostered by its potential for conflict. The sole 
ownership of expertise within the YJB introduced  competing claims to expert authority 
which formed a powerful means of resistance to ministers and advisers. This reflects Weber’s 
central problem of bureaucratic power, in which he suggests that a permanent bureaucracy 
creates challenges for the authority of ministers who are in office a short time and thus have 
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less experience than their advisers (Weber 1946). While the generalist approach of the civil 
service mitigates the disruptive effects of technical expertise on hierarchical authority (Page 
and Jenkins 2005, p148) this is not the case in an expert body such as the YJB. Given the 
YJB’s potential disconnect with ministerial initiatives, this inevitably creates the potential for 
conflict.  
This was seen particularly clearly in 2006 at the end of Rod Morgan’s tenure as Chair of the 
YJB. Fears that a fraught Home Office had lost control of the law and order agenda had lead 
the New Labour government to promote punitive, headline-grabbing initiatives, such as the 
‘Respect’ agenda which focused on youthful antisocial behaviour. Morgan advised that 
extensive research evidence demonstrated such strategies were both criminalising and 
criminogenic (e.g. McAra and McVie 2007). However, in the political climate his advice was 
not acceptable and ignored by ministers. Morgan felt so strongly that his advice was both 
morally and factually correct that he gave a series of press interviews critical of government 
policy. He argued that it was the YJB’s ‘duty’ as an expert advisory body to make their 
advice public where private channels of communication had failed: ‘If we think that there are 
aspects of the way policy is being interpreted which is counter-productive, which is making 
things worse rather than better… then we have a duty to say it’. 
However, for ministers this made the YJB both embarrassing and irritating. The immediate 
consequence was that Morgan’s tenure as Chair was not renewed in 2007. However, more 
broadly it drew attention to the political risks posed by the YJB. As an MoJ senior policy 
official  said: 
I think the one accusation you might have levelled at Rod [Morgan] was that his 
behaviour nearly caused the abolition of the YJB.  …Francis Maude in particular 
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looked at the YJB and said, well why are we paying to be shouted at by people who 
are supposed to be delivering stuff on our behalf? 
Moreover, the YJB was now a financially important organisation. Their role as commissioner 
of the juvenile secure estate had significantly increased their budget, particularly when the 
prison population was at capacity and the estate very large.  Its risks to the department were 
therefore considerable. A senior MoJ official explained, ‘it [YJB] was a half a billion pound 
organisation … and it was a player, it was bigger than some departments’.   
Abolishing the YJB 
In this way, the expert authority and normative principles introduced by the YJB’s structural 
separation from the civil service not only made it an important body in the administration of 
youth justice,  but a politically and financially risky one. However, once under negative 
scrutiny, the separation of the YJB from the bureaucratic rationality of the civil service also 
made it difficult to defend. The remainder of this article describes three key aspects of 
vulnerability, which also suggests what a youth justice system might look like without an 
NDPB at its core.  
1.  Evidence of success 
The question of whether the YJB has been successful in its overarching aim to reduce 
reoffending was central in its reprieve. The government not only failed to consider whether 
any of the 500 arm’s length bodies in its cull actually worked (e.g. House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts 2011, p3), but made its decision to abolish the YJB as the 
youth justice system experienced a marked decline in the numbers of first time entrants to the 
system (a fall of 67 per cent from 83,312 in 2002/03 to 27,854 in 2012/13) and the under-18 
custodial population (a fall of 49 per cent from 3,029 in 2002/03 to 1,544 in 2012/13 
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(YJB/Ministry of Justice 2014)). These trends were held as evidence of the YJB’s success: in 
the final House of Lords debate Lord Woolf argued that ‘it would be sacrilege if.. we took out 
of the criminal justice system something that works’ (Hansard 28th March 2011: Column 
961).  
It is likely these trends are to some extent connected to the activities of the YJB. They not 
only had the expertise to identify solutions and act independently, but most importantly their 
location as a central but outward-facing body put them in a powerful position to lobby 
magistrates and criminal justice agencies, thereby facilitating a ‘systems management’ 
approach. As a former Chair put it, the Board have ‘got relationships with magistrates, the 
police, police and crime commissioners, 43 of them, we’re out there all the time, chief 
executives, Local Government Association, whatever’.   
However, the difficulty for the YJB is that any change in rates of offending cannot be 
straightforwardly connected to what it does.  First, as a cross-cutting policy area, changes in 
other areas of criminal justice, health or education can have a potent effect on rates of 
offending, whether indirectly through their impact on the lives of vulnerable young people, or 
through changes to counting rules, definition, or process. This was demonstrated clearly by 
the Offences Brought to Justice (OBTJ) initiative instituted by the Home Office in 2002, 
which created incentives for police officers to target relatively trivial youth crime, thereby 
driving up the numbers of young people entering the system (e.g. Justice Select Committee 
2013, p8). These factors are themselves shaped by the broader political climate (e.g. see 
Bateman (2012) on the fall in prison population).  
Moreover, it is in any case difficult to draw a direct connection between the services the YJB 
supports and changes in offending behaviour. Youth justice work is focused on what Schön  
(1983, p42) has famously described as a ‘swampy lowland where situations are confusing 
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“messes” incapable of technical solution’. Practitioners’ work involves improvising solutions 
to complex problems by drawing on background knowledge and expertise. It is therefore both 
difficult to describe and can only be loosely coupled with outcomes (Meyerson 1991, 
Souhami 2007).  
 
The difficulty in demonstrating ‘success’ was implicitly understood within the YJB: while 
staff were certain that the decline in first time entrants and prison population were to some 
extent connected to their work, they recognised that, as a former Chair put it: ‘the reasons for 
things is so difficult to pin down in youth justice’. The demands of civil servants for evidence 
of the outcomes of services was seen as indicative of their lack of understanding of the field. 
For example, a former Chair said:  
Sometimes you can’t prove it, but you know, we can feel it. I’ve had so many civil 
servants say to me …‘oh, perhaps we could do this!’ and I’m saying, ‘I don’t think 
that will work’. And they say ‘well how do you know?’ and I think well, actually, 
because compared to you I’ve been working in this business for about forty years … 
I’ve seen it all, and I can tell you if you do that … it will not get the end result. But I 
can’t prove it, how can you, you know? 
Instead, the YJB needed to make the figures qualitative: as the Chair put it, to ‘tell the story 
in a way which is reasonable’ and which convinced MoJ analysts and policy makers of their 
value.     
 
However, the challenge for the YJB is not just that the evidence they can present is 
experiential rather than technical, but that, despite its legitimating rhetoric of bureaucratic 
rationality, the work of policy officials is equally intuitive and ideologically invested. 
Evidence is selected, ignored or interpreted to legitimize particular programmes and 
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undermine others, particularly in relation to contested policy areas (e.g. Majone 1989, Nelkin 
1975). Similarly, what is considered ‘evidence’ reflects underlying values, with forms of 
evidence deemed ‘scientific’ or ‘technical’ given greater authority than others, and the expert 
knowledge of those professions involved in social regulation (doctors, lawyers, economists) 
given greater authority than occupations such as social work which are deemed to represent a 
knowledge base that is too closely tied to ‘special interests’ (Brint 1990, p377).    In this 
context, the expert knowledge and intuitive evidence offered by the YJB are low status, and 
can be countered with alternative stories of higher authority. So, for example, MoJ officials 
accounted for the decline in first time entrants by factors more amenable to quantification 
such as demography (‘there was less young people born 15 years ago’), the scrapping of 
OBTJ, a broader decline in offending across Europe, or even the removal of lead from petrol 
which American environmental research  has claimed is associated with a decline in 
criminality (e.g. Reyes 2007).  
 
At the time of this research, the YJB’s narratives of success remained largely persuasive. For 
example, an MoJ senior policy official explained why he defended YOT budgets against 
further cuts:   
[YJB Chair and Chief Exec] did a good job of convincing me and my boss … who 
holds the budget …that money has been directly involved in the fall of first time 
entrants coming into the system.  ….  So if that's come down, we close places, so we 
save 200 million pounds for the estate. If that was to go up then we have to build our 
way out of a problem again.  And that if we keep on reducing the YOT grant, then 
they will take their eyes off some of the prevention work, and the number of first time 
entrants will go up again.   
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However, the shift in mood towards the YJB in central government and the increasing 
pressures for stringent cuts revealed the vulnerability of these narratives.  The senior policy 
official added, ‘the difficulty is … they still can't prove that that money is having that effect, 
everyone just kind of thinks that it probably is’. Authoritative evidence was becoming 
particularly important in a climate in which, as the senior policy official put it, the current 
Secretary of State, Chris Grayling was  ‘very managerial, and interested in what's the unit 
cost of everything, and what's this pound buying me’.  Moreover, scrutiny of the effects of 
the YJB broadened critical attention to the efficacy of the entire youth justice system.  As the 
senior policy official  explained, ‘I've no doubt there's probably some really good work going 
on in YOTs, we just can't prove it’: 
When you've got a minister like Chris, one of the things for the next parliament will 
be, well if we’re throwing 100 million quid [YOT core grant] at this and it's not 
buying me any better reoffending outcomes, then I'll spend that 100 million quid in a 
different way.  It's what any new minister will think if I can't tell them what it's 
buying them.  
In this way, the removal of the YJB from the legitimating rhetoric of rationality not only 
risked their own survival, but that of wider youth justice structures too.  
 
2. Emotion  
Second, the explicitly normative basis of the YJB’s work was experienced by senior MoJ 
officials as conflicting with the style of bureaucratic rationality prized within civil service 
culture. As a senior policy official  put it: ‘as an organisation, they have been and are still, in 
some areas, dysfunctional …because they are full of specialists, and it's an emotional 
organisation’.  
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In part, this dysfunctionality was attributed to the non-civil servant backgrounds of YJB staff: 
a result of ‘having so many people who have been practitioners’, ‘an old school probation 
way of doing things’. In other words, staff simply did not have the technical and managerial 
skills prioritised within the civil service. So, for example, MoJ officials described their 
frustration at the YJB’s auditing procedures, accounting and governance arrangements which 
did not meet expected departmental standards. A senior official explained  
They are not bureaucrats, and I use that in the positive sense of the word… [emotion] 
could make them blind to the fact that there were things that they needed and 
should've been doing, and I mean things like governance … There was a complete 
lack of attention to the proper administration of the organisation.  Because it was all 
about the kids!   
Further, the normative basis of the YJB’s work was thought to produce a heightened 
emotionality which intruded on the bureaucratic rationality on which the civil service is 
ostensibly based. A senior policy official explained:  
There's an awful lot of meetings out there where people go, ‘but these are children!’  
And I’m like, I know, you know, but we were talking about a budget issue or 
something, but they feel the need to remind me that it's children we're talking about. 
However, it was acknowledged by senior officers that the MoJ was not as always as rational 
as it may seem: instead, its scrutiny of YJB governance arrangements was itself emotionally 
fuelled. The defeat in the House of Lords had led to an overt antagonism towards the YJB 
among  ministers and the department as a whole. A senior policy official  explained:  
‘Organisations don't like losing, do they? So … we lost, we went into a bit of a spasm of, you 
know, we don't like this. So we made life pretty difficult for the YJB’. Instead, the perceived 
conflict in the YJB’s style of operation appeared to be indicative of a deeper conflict in 
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organisational aims, in which the YJB prioritised principles of welfare above organisational 
goals including efficiency and effectiveness.   
 
It is important to note that the value of the YJB’s ability to prioritise normative objectives 
above organisational goals was recognised by MoJ officials. As one senior official explained, 
YJB staff were ‘hugely passionate about making sure they were making the right decisions 
for the kids… it wasn't just a process, these were living human beings, and not only that, very 
vulnerable and young ones’.   Indeed, as a senior policy official  put it, ‘if you replaced them 
all with people like me tomorrow it would be a disaster’. Without the YJB, he explained, 
youth justice risked becoming ‘another commodity, another bit of the estate that we have to 
kind of manage … frankly what we do with the adults’. Moreover, as a senior official 
explained, it had an important effect on central policy-making:  
I think the fact that people cared…  having the ex-practitioners and people who had 
worked in those industries working in the YJB brought a knowledge about the 
realities of these kids into the organisation.  And that, I think, helped deepen the 
richness of the debate that you would have about policy, about the art of the possible. 
Yet nonetheless the difference in organisational goals created a fundamental conflict. The 
YJB simply didn’t fit with the aims and style of executive government and as such was seen 
by its ministerial sponsors as unfit for purpose. As a senior policy official  put it, ‘having 
those people run an organisation at all the levels, I'm not sure is healthy….it needs people 
who can run an organisation, not people who joined it in order to change people.’ 
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3.  Control 
Finally, there is a fundamental tension in the YJB’s establishment at arm’s length from 
central government to protect it from ministerial control, and the cultural and political 
pressures on departments for that control. As a senior policy official  put it;   
One of the big drivers for ministers wanting to abolish this [YJB] is to have some 
control over them….Control of the policy, what people are saying... you would never 
have a Rod Morgan problem again. 
Similarly, the delegation of operational matters to the YJB prevents ministers from close 
involvement in the details of youth justice services:  
You know, we meddle hugely in the adult estate, we're forever telling NOMS that 
people should be going to bed at 11pm or whatever…stuff that's generally operational 
stuff, but ministers care about 'cause there's a huge amount of political risk in it.  And 
they're unable to do that in the youth estate, as easily7. 
   (Senior policy official, MoJ) 
 
In the asymmetric power relationship between the YJB and its departmental sponsors, the 
extent to which it is able to protect services from ministerial interference is limited. However, 
as this indicates, at the least the YJB adds a layer of insulation between ministerial impulses 
and implementation.  For ministers with an impulse to meddle, this is problematic.  
                                                 
7 Ironically, it has now been announced that Chris Grayling has instructed all YOI governors to enforce a 
10.30pm cell lights-out policy. This demonstrates the hierarchy in which the YJB operates: while it can 
persuade, ministerial decisions remain paramount.  The key issue for this paper however is that, unlike its civil 
service colleagues, the YJB is both more able and motivated  to persuade 
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Conclusion 
The ‘new youth justice’ set in train by New Labour’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998 continues 
to be criticised by youth justice scholars who have powerfully illuminated its damaging 
legacy. However, this paper argues that the central institutional architecture it put in place is  
an important and unheralded aspect of New Labour’s reforms. The establishment of an 
executive NDPB removed the administration of youth justice from the civil service and 
placed it at arm’s length from ministers, within a specialist body. This not only allowed for 
expertise, continuity and an oversight of cross-cutting policy areas that impact on vulnerable 
young people, but  introduced a competing series of claims to expert and moral authority, 
enabling decision making at the centre to be structured by the best interests of the child rather 
than ministerial agendas. This is particularly important given the centrality of government 
bureaucracy in configuring both policy outcomes and what is thinkable within central 
government. As the MoJ official cited here put it, the YJB deepened debate about ‘the art of 
the possible’.     
 
Yet there is a paradox in the YJB’s position as an NDPB: the same structural features that 
make its organisational location so important are also those which make it both risky for 
central government, and difficult to defend.   Despite an initial confidence in the survival of 
the YJB after the government’s humiliation over its failed abolition, the research reported 
here suggests its future remains uncertain.   
 
It is of course right that the delivery of executive functions of government should continue to 
be held up to scrutiny. Moreover, there are undoubtedly ways in which the YJB could be 
usefully reformed: for example, a transfer in sponsorship from the MoJ to the Department for 
Education (or, more pragmatically, a renewal of its joint sponsorship arrangement with the 
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MoJ and the (then) DCSF from 2007-20108) would undoubtedly support the YJB in giving 
greater priority to young people’s welfare needs. However, it is paramount that a specialist 
body dedicated to youth justice remains at the heart of the youth justice system. The 
institutions of central bureaucracy are not all the same. Instead, the central organisation of 
youth justice systems is of fundamental importance: both as a focus of criminological study, 
and, most importantly, to the young people who are subject to them. 
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